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Abstract
This article addresses the issue of the relationship between ‘the market’ and democracy in the European Union from a 
critical political economy perspective. It argues that the way the European Union institutions and national governments 
are attempting to solve the current economic and financial problems of the Eurozone enhances the trend towards ‘new 
constitutionalist’ arrangement that were already present. A detailed analysis of the reforms is proposed, as well as an 
historical perspective on the relationship between ‘the market’ and democracy that has characterised Western political 
economies. The recent reforms of EU economic governance are thus seen as furthering the insulation of socio-economic 
policy-making from public’s electoral accountability.
Introduction
Recent developments in the Eurozone, such as the 
formation of technocratic governments in Greece and 
Italy, the creation of new, more binding, European rules 
regarding public finances and the tough conditions 
posed in exchange for the granting of bailout pack-
ages, have been increasingly perceived by both public 
opinion and academia as a curtailment of the demo-
cratic principles that constitute the foundation of the 
European Union (EU) (McGiffen 2011; Streeck 2011).
The issue of the democratic deficit was and continues 
to be at the centre of academic attention (some clas-
sic works include Weiler et al 1995 and Coultrap 1999). 
While some scholars stress the inconsistency of the 
democratic deficit issue and, on the basis of arguments 
of efficiency and output legitimacy, reject the view of 
a democratic deficit problem that is specific to the EU 
(Moravcsik 2002; Crombez 2003), also on Pareto-effi-
cient grounds (Majone 1994; 2006), others continue to 
underline that the EU is much less than an ideal pol-
ity in democratic terms.  While a procedural electoral 
approach has focused on the lack of proper electoral 
institutions at European level (Decker 2002; Hix and 
Follesdal 2006; Lord and Beetham 2001), a delibera-
tive ‘Habermasian’ approach stresses the weakness of a 
European ‘public sphere’ or ‘strong public’ (Eriksen and 
Fossum 2002; Meny 2002) and what can be termed a 
‘social legitimacy’ analysis focuses on the issue of the 
lack of a European ‘demos’ (Bartolini 2006; Zielonska 
2006). 
However, from a critical political economy (Cox 1981, 
1983, 1987) perspective, as the one adopted in this 
study, it is more interesting to study the current state 
of democracy within the EU by looking at its continu-
ally evolving relationship with the sphere of ‘the mar-
ket’, itself the outcome of social and political struggles 
between classes that are constitutive of the capitalist 
mode of production. A crucial point regarding the de-
bate on the democratic deficit is that it often takes as 
given fixed definitions of what ‘democracy’ as such is, 
while seeking to compare this ideal to the EU. A histori-
cist critical political economy approach however, seeks 
to relate the historical manifestations of democracy 
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and the possibilities of democratic participation with 
the current phase of integration, without needing to fix 
once and for all what democracy or human freedom are. 
Scholars working within the critical political economy 
approach have focused on a variety of issues regarding 
European integration (Bieler and Morton 2001; Cafruny 
and Ryner 2003, 2007; van Apeldoorn, Drahokopuil and 
Horn 2009; van Apeldoorn 2002; Bieler 2006; Overbeek 
2003; Van der Pijl 2006b).
However, there has been no attempt so far to analyse 
the consequences that the recent reforms of European 
economic governance have had on democratic pro-
cesses from this perspective. Here my aim is to apply 
Gill’s concept of ‘new constitutionalism’ as a heuristic 
tool in order to shed new light on the European eco-
nomic governance reforms. ‘New constitutionalism’ 
describes a neoliberal international governance frame-
work whereby economic policies are increasingly sep-
arated from broad political accountability “in order to 
make governments more responsive to the discipline 
of market forces, and correspondingly less responsive 
to popular-democratic forces and processes” (Gill 2001: 
47). The argument proposed is that the enacted reforms 
will in fact exacerbate the trend towards a ‘new con-
stitutionalist’ framework by locking in a set of harsher 
constraints on the possibility of democratic processes 
to influence socio-economic policy making. 
The focus here is neither solely on EU institutions nor on 
member states. Rather, what is stressed is the character 
of transnationalism of the process of transformation, 
which must not be juxtaposed to either national and 
supranational: “transnational processes are those that 
take place simultaneously in subnational, national, and 
international arenas” (van Apeldoorn, Overbeek and 
Ryner 2003: 39).  A critical political economy approach 
thus goes beyond both state-centric and structuralist 
approaches, examining the social origin of state power 
in capital as a social force, a discipline over society and 
nature.  As Van der Pijl has argued, “capital remains a 
force that by preference seeks to occupy the intercon-
nections between separate political jurisdictions” (Van 
der Pijl 2006b: 15). Thus, the state-system and the logic 
of capital are interrelated and the current mode of pro-
duction has been characterised by transnational social 
relations. For the purposes of this paper, the main actors 
behind the process of ‘new constitutionalism’ are identi-
fied in the transnational historical bloc of social forces 
that has been at the origin of the neoliberal ‘compre-
hensive concept of control’ (Van der Pijl 1998 ch.4) and 
the concomitant shift to financialisation as a mode of 
accumulation (McNally 2011; Fine 2009).  This bloc, itself 
a political synthesis of interests and identities from dif-
ferent countries, is made up of a transnational manage-
rial class, other elements of transnationalising produc-
tive capital in manufacturing – including many small 
and medium enterprises involved in sub-contracting 
– and elements of financial capital involved in banking, 
insurance and finance (Bieler and Morton 2006 p.18; 
see Van der Pijl 1998; Bieler and Morton 2001). Crucially, 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) is seen as a stra-
tegic project of globally oriented finance and industrial 
capital (Van Apeldoorn 2001). In brief, this study con-
siders class agency within and across nations to be the 
central analytical category and thus as bringing about 
the transformations described.
However, in an attempt to overcome the reductionist 
and economicist trends in Marxist political economy, 
a neo-Gramscian approach stresses the fundamental 
discursive dimension of class agency and power. Thus, 
ideas and discourses are not simply complementary as-
pects to be added on in an ad-hoc fashion to the analy-
sis; they are constitutive of our world, they contribute to 
the very production and reproduction of capitalist so-
cial relations and of the wider historical structures. His-
torical structures (a particular configuration of power in 
the dimension of ideas, material capabilities and institu-
tions) are not seen as determining the actors’ choices 
but as influencing them (Cox 1981). This frames a dia-
lectical relation between agencies in structures that 
is well summed-up by Marx’ oft-quoted phrase: “men 
make their own history, but they do not make it as 
they please; they do not make it under circumstances 
of their own choosing, but under circumstances exist-
ing already, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx 
1963 p.15). Every social force aims at making its view 
of the world the dominant one, thus creating ‘limits of 
the possible’ in political terms that condition the way 
people and classes can understand their social world 
and the possibilities for change. Ideas, in this concep-
tualisation, have a material structure (Bieler 2001). Thus, 
one must conceive the logic of action as constituted 
by both material interests and ideas as inseparable ele-
ments of human agency and historical transformation. 
It is precisely the role of ‘organic intellectuals’ to develop 
ideas that create a framework of thought for the social 
force they are the expression of.  
Critical theory differs from problem-solving theory on-
tologically, epistemologically and methodologically 
(see Cox 1981 for the classic argument). Adopting a 
critical theory approach, the article will not formulate 
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or test hypotheses here. This work is conceived as an 
instance of a descriptive interpretive case study. The lat-
ter “interprets or explains an event by applying a known 
theory to the new terrain. (…) Although this method 
may not test a theory, the case study shows that one or 
more known theories can be extended to account for 
a new event” (Odell 2001: 163). My aim is to apply Gill’s 
theoretical concept of ‘new constitutionalism’ to a new 
case: post-reform European Union.  The empirical mate-
rial used includes documents of EU institutions acces-
sible through the official websites, as well as legislative 
proposals and a variety of academic and journalistic 
commentary. 
The article is divided into five parts. It begins by provid-
ing a historical reflection on the relationship between 
capitalism and democracy within neo-liberalism. It 
then presents Gill’s notion of ‘new constitutionalism’ 
and briefly engages with alternative theories of Euro-
pean integration, as well as with the critiques of ‘new 
constitutionalism’ that have been advanced within criti-
cal political economy itself. Parts three and four are de-
voted respectively to a description and an analysis of 
the reforms enacted. The fifth part reviews the origins 
and consequences of the economic and financial crisis 
in the Eurozone.
The de-politicisation of ‘the 
economy’
In the post-war years, there was a widely held assump-
tion that for capitalism to be compatible with democra-
cy, it needed to be subjected to extensive political con-
trol. This was the golden era of the welfare state, what in 
France was known as the trente glorieuses of economic 
growth, rising standard of living for everyone and the 
creation of effective mechanisms of social protection. 
Liberalism incorporated the welfare state concept and 
thus recognised the power asymmetries that constitute 
‘the market’, in turn legitimizing public intervention to 
guarantee social rights and entitlements following Po-
lanyi’s logic of ‘social protection’ (Polanyi 1957). 
Since then, mainstream economics has however slowly 
but systematically aimed at undermining the idea of 
public intervention in the ‘economy’, and has become 
“obsessed with the irresponsibility of opportunistic 
politicians who cater to an economically uneducated 
electorate by interfering with otherwise efficient mar-
kets, in pursuit of objectives – such as full employment 
and social justice – that truly free markets would in the 
long run deliver anyway but must fail to deliver when 
distorted by politics” (Streeck 2011:6). In fact, econom-
ics as a discipline has arguably been an important 
vector in the advancement of neoliberalism, as neo-
classical theory provides a micro-economic theory set 
against the state’s intervention in the economy. It has 
become what Marx called a ‘material force’. In Van der 
Pijl’s  (2006a: 160) words:
As economics, neoliberalism enshrines capital 
as the sovereign force in organising society. The 
sole agencies that it explicitly recognises are the 
property-owning individual, who is ‘free’ to en-
gage in a competitive quest for improvement; 
and the market, which is the regulator of that 
quest. Capital, as the mobile wealth that has 
already accumulated and has entrenched itself 
politically, is obscured as a social force by res-
urrecting an imagined universe of individuals, 
some of whom happen to own Microsoft and 
other only their labour, or not even that. Neo-
liberalism thus naturalises capitalist relations by 
taking the economic definition of man as the 
starting point for an integral social science while 
leaving outcomes entirely contingent. 
The social and economic crisis of 1970s was interpreted 
by the authors of the famous essay The Crisis of Democ-
racy as stemming precisely from an excess of democ-
racy. From democracy being carried over and invading 
the sphere of the economy, where it should not adven-
ture itself (Crozier et al. 1975). The solution advanced 
was that microeconomic rationality should be restored 
to the individual’s choices. ‘Discretionary’ political inter-
ference into the economy should be avoided. 
Thus, by resurrecting the idea of ‘the market’ – the term 
‘market economy’ gradually substituted the term ‘capi-
talism’ – as the regulator of each individual’s freedom 
and capacity, capital is effectively hidden as a social 
force which acts within the market sphere, and what is 
instead promoted is the idea of a ‘neutral’ sphere regu-
lating the merits and life-chances of individuals.
The trends described above have arguably been exac-
erbated by a situation of crisis, which – as the neoliberal 
economist Friedman himself remarked (Friedman 2002: 
300) –  is often a productive moment for the introduc-
tion of radical reforms. The dominant narration reflects 
a de-politicised naturalisation of the crisis. Thus, the 
new regulatory measures are, as Zizek points out, “pre-
sented not as decisions grounded in political choices 
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but as the imperatives of a neutral financial logic – if 
we want our economies to stabilise, we simply have to 
swallow the bitter pill” (Zizek 2011: 85). 
‘New Constitutionalism’: 
bracketing ‘the economy’
One of the main elements of neoliberal governance, 
theorised by Stephen Gill, is what has been termed 
‘new constitutionalism’. It consists of a tendency to 
insulate significant aspects of economic policy from 
popular-democratic accountability, and subordinating 
them to technocratic management. In Gill’s words, we 
are witnessing the “imposition of new constitutional 
and quasi-constitutional political and legal frameworks 
– with respect to the state and the operation of strate-
gic, macroeconomic, microeconomic and social policy” 
(Gill 2000). This process entails the proliferation of con-
stitutionally guaranteed arrangements for macroeco-
nomic policies, such as the creation of independent 
central banks and of balanced budget laws, leading to a 
form of ‘sanitised democracy’ (van der Pijl 2006b). In es-
sence, new constitutionalism enshrines, in Gill’s words, 
“the discipline of capital in social relations”, that is the 
“politico-legal dimension of the wider discourse of neo-
liberalism” (Gill 2000:47) and makes alternative models 
of development more difficult to bring about demo-
cratically (Gill 2012).
Within the EU framework since Maastricht, several ele-
ments signal the move towards a ‘new constitutionalist’ 
settlement (the following is partly based on Gill 2001). 
First, the institutionalisation of strict fiscal discipline in 
order to make governments more ‘credible’ to inves-
tors and de-socialise risk provision through the welfare 
state. Second, the management of the monetary policy 
by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the modifi-
cation of its status would require the agreement of all 
national parliaments. Moreover, its main task is to fight 
inflation, with other goals being subordinated to this 
objective. Third, the creation of the Single European 
Market based on the constitutionalisation of market 
freedoms (the four freedoms) within the EU that makes 
it more difficult for member states to implement de-
mand management or public intervention policies. For 
instance, competition policy and the rules of the inter-
nal market are guarded by the European Commission 
and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Fourth, the 
unelected Commission has the exclusive power of leg-
islative initiative, and within a relatively broad mandate 
laid down by member states, exercises day-to-day con-
trol over external trade. In addition, the development 
of a ‘juridical Europe’ (Holman and van der Pijl 2003), 
spurred by the constitutionalisation of the internal mar-
ket with its four freedoms, has increased the power of 
the ECJ on socio-economic governance, thus further-
ing its insulation from democratic control.  Moreover, as 
Van Apeldoorn (2000) has argued, EU-level labour mar-
ket and social policies have been framed within a ‘new 
competitiveness discourse’ sponsored by transnational 
business organisations such as the European Roundta-
ble of Industrialists.
The general outcome is that, within the framework of 
EMU, governments become more responsive to the 
discipline of transnational market forces, expressed in 
the need to maintain freedom for capitals, low inflation 
and low corporate taxes, to balance national budgets 
and keep public spending under control, while deregu-
lating the labour market (Gill 2009). Thus, “public policy 
has been redefined in such a way that governments 
seek to prove their credibility” to capital, their policies 
judged “according to the degree to which they inspire 
the confidence of investors” (Gill 2000: 47). 
Van der Pijl (2006b: 29) usefully sums up the thrust of the 
‘new constitutionalist’ framework. He argues that “just 
as economic competitors are not supposed to chal-
lenge the nature of the market economy itself (which 
is why the state has to be separate from the economy 
and refrain from taking on any activity which private 
subjects can handle), the participants in the democratic 
competition must accept the ‘level playing field’, that is 
the existing socio-political order”.  Thus, the bounda-
ries of the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ realms are rede-
signed in order to lessen short-run political pressures 
on the formulation of economic policy so that many re-
distributive policies, let alone a radical change in socio-
economic policy, are rendered more difficult, or even 
illegal (it could even be argued that ‘inequality’ cannot 
become an election issue).
Mainstream integration theories are largely unable to 
account for such changes as they focus on the form 
rather than the content of European integration. Ne-
glecting the capitalist nature of the European polity, 
which is embedded in a world capitalist totality, main-
stream theories also lack the conceptual tools to ana-
lyse the social content and social purpose of the recent 
phase of integration.  Behind mainstream theories of 
European integration there is an unspoken assumption 
that “market forces are expressions of an inner ration-
ality of universal human nature that is held to be the 
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essence of the realm of freedom in political affairs” (van 
Apeldoorn, Overbeek and Ryner 2003: 17-18). A critical 
political economy approach – grounded in a Marxist-
Gramscian perspective – on the other hand, by focus-
ing on the social power constitutive of a ‘market econ-
omy’, stresses the embedding of institutions into wider 
historical structures (Cox 1981), which are produced 
and reproduced through class struggle and hegemony. 
In extreme synthesis, within a historicist perspective, 
what is refused is also the idea that human freedom has 
found its ultimate realisation in liberal political institu-
tions (Bobbio 1955). 
Neofunctionalism (the classic reference here is Haas 
1968) and intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1991, 1993; 
Milward 2000), as well as recent attempts to modify the 
theories to respond to critiques and take into account 
new developments (Sandholz and Zysman 1989 and 
Moravcsik 1998) all adopt utilitarian and individualist 
assumptions that are not able to understand the nature 
of social power relations, grounded as they are in the 
asymmetries generated by the mode of production. In 
these accounts, power as such is seen as the realm of 
the state or of supranational institutions, while civil so-
ciety is viewed as the sphere of freedom, of free interac-
tions among human beings. Neo-functionalist analyses 
could argue that the pooling of decision-making power 
on fiscal policy in the recent reforms (see below) is the 
outcome of a ‘spillover effect’ in times of crisis. However, 
they would be unable to grasp the fundamental social 
purpose that lies behind these reforms, as they lack the 
instruments to conceptualise social power as such, and 
thus to contextualise the shifting boundaries between 
‘the market’ and democratic participation.
Multilevel governance theory (see Hix  1999) goes be-
yond previous approaches by looking at the EU as a 
sui generis political system that can be analysed with 
the tools of comparative politics. However, as van Apel-
doorn, Overbeek and Ryner point out (2001: 26-29), 
such approach can be subjected to the critique that the 
Marxists advanced to pluralist political science in the 
1960s. The thrust of the argument was that the com-
petition among interest groups within a state does not 
take place on equal terms, as the very structure of capi-
talism makes the state much more responsive to capi-
tal’s interests. For instance, the state’s dependence on 
state revenue and on the investment decisions of firms 
makes state policy skewed towards meeting the valori-
sation goals of capital rather than other objectives. 
Within critical political economy, critiques that point 
to weaknesses in the concept of ‘new constitutional-
ism’ have been advanced. Bruff (2010) ha argued that 
the concept, together with the whole approach of 
‘transnational historical materialism’, suffers from the 
assumption of institutional isomorphism: “the implicit 
argument is that this transformative project, once for-
mulated at the European level, is able to penetrate the 
member states in a uniform manner because the na-
tional units fall into line what the supranational unit dic-
tates” (Ibidem: 618). He points out that by subsuming 
the ‘national’ into the ‘transnational’, any change in the 
national political economies is seen as caused by the 
entrenchment of neoliberalism at EU level by transna-
tional capital, and that this stance neglects the ‘national’ 
as a focus of analysis: “the impression that once gets – 
despite what the intentions may have been – is that na-
tional capitalisms are little more than functional to the 
interests of transnational capital as expressed through 
the EU’s institutional architecture” (Ibidem: 619). This cri-
tique then warrants – according to the author – the de-
velopment of a theory that analyses the national while 
remaining aware of the conditioning of the internation-
al.  Strange (2006) has also advanced a critique of ‘new 
constitutionalism’, arguing that Gill neglects the politi-
cally contested nature of the concept of constitution-
alism and thus adopts a determinist approach arguing 
that the single currency project is to be equated une-
quivocally with monetarism and neoliberalism: “for the 
new constitutionalists, European integration and the 
Euro (are) simply attempts by the transnational elite to 
consolidate economic globalisation politically” (Ibidem: 
214); “Despite its explicit analytical emphasis on agency 
(especially the transnational global elite), new constitu-
tionalism is substantively structuralist in its understand-
ing of the relationship between the (structurally domi-
nant) transnational capital, (facilitating) EU governance 
and (structurally dominated) broadly progressive/social 
democratic interests”(Ibidem: 226).
The point, however, is that ‘new constitutionalism’ is 
not an all-encompassing concept that describes the 
framework within which socio-economic policy is car-
ried out and that completely subsumes the national 
unit. It is – in interpretation adopted by in this article – a 
tendency that is operative within neoliberalism, and as 
any form of political and social struggle, it is prone to 
counter-tendencies and resistance that are operative 
also at the national level. In both Van Apeldoorn’s and 
Gill’s analyses there is attention to forms of agency.  The 
framework that was devised at Maastricht, for instance, 
is not seen as purely neoliberal, as it is the outcome of a 
skewed compromise between alternative political pro-
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jects for European integration, with the predominance 
of the neoliberal project (see Van Apeldoorn 2002). 
Thus, there are elements of social policy at European 
level, and fiscal transfers in the form of structural and 
regional funds do play a role. There are also channels 
for democratic accountability. The Commission is not 
entirely insulated from democratic control, as commis-
sioners are nominated by the president in accordance 
with member states. The parliament does have a role to 
play in an increasing number of areas of policy-making 
at the European level. However, the general trend has 
been towards the limitation of popular-democratic ac-
countability, as noted above. 
According to Van Apeldoorn, since Maastricht, the EU 
witnessed the rise of an ‘embedded neoliberal’ he-
gemony in which European socio-economic govern-
ance subordinates member states to the interests of 
global transnational capital, at the same time commit-
ting itself to limited elements of ‘embeddedness’ (in the 
Polanyian sense) that are however almost exclusively 
rooted in national institutional frameworks (van Apel-
doorn 2002). The author has also focused (2009) on 
the increasingly relevant problems of legitimacy of the 
European neoliberal project at the national level, thus 
incorporating an analysis of the different national class 
compromises within the European ‘new constitutional-
ist’ settlement. Accordingly, it is the national state that 
must guarantee welfare state entitlements in the face 
of European constraints. Moreover, Gill himself never 
argues – contra Strange – that a single currency is to be 
equated with neoliberalism. In fact, he acknowledges 
the possibility of devising alternative forms of monetary 
and political union that are based on alternative social 
forces and political projects (Gill 2001 pp.61-69). There 
is therefore no neglect of the national dimension and of 
the contested nature of ‘new constitutionalism’ and no 
structural determinism at work.
“A silent revolution”
Recent reforms of the Stability and growth pact (SGP) 
and economic governance in the EU and in the Euro-
zone in particular have been defined by President of 
the European Commission Barroso as a ‘silent revolu-
tion’ (Corporate Europe Observatory 2011: 2). 
At the beginning of October 2011, the Council has 
agreed upon a package of six legislative proposals on 
economic governance, the so-called “six-pack”, explic-
itly designed in order to strengthen “economic govern-
ance in the EU – and more specifically in the Euro area 
– as part of the EU’s response to the current turmoil on 
sovereign debt markets” (Council of the EU 2011). These 
reforms make the SGP stronger in both the prevention 
and enforcement stages. The public deficit and public 
debt criteria are placed on equal footing for the first 
time, and a new voting procedure (‘reverse qualified 
majority’ voting) has been adopted. 
 The reforms have concerned how fiscal and eco-
nomic policies are conducted in the EU member states. 
The innovations put in place can be broadly divided in 
two main areas: the new economic governance proce-
dures and the initiatives taken apparently outside the 
formal institutional framework of the EU: the so-called 
Europe 2020 initiative and the Euro plus pact.1 As will be 
shown, these two innovations are tightly linked and to-
gether constitute the new framework for dealing with 
socio-economic governance in the EU.
The changes to the ‘economic governance’ of the EU 
introduced with the so-called ‘Six-pack’ are essentially 
three (see: EU press release 2011a; Council of the EU 
2011):
1. Stronger preventive arm. With regards to 
the SGP, each member state is assigned a me-
dium-term budgetary objective (MTO) setting 
limits to expenditure growth, which should not 
exceed the medium-term GDP growth rate. 
Each member state commits itself to a Stabil-
ity or Convergence Programme (SCP), includ-
ing the structural reforms needed to achieve 
fiscal sustainability. If the member state fails to 
respect the programme, an enforcement proce-
dure is activated which can lead to a sanction in 
the form of an interest-bearing deposit amount-
ing to 0.2 percent of GDP (for Eurozone states), 
which can later be turned into a fine. It is impor-
tant to note that the final decision can be taken 
by the Council following the so-called ‘reverse 
majority’ voting procedure (meaning that it will 
be adopted unless a simple majority of member 
states votes against it). This marks an important 
innovation, as to date countries could be pun-
ished only if a qualified majority of Eurozone 
countries voted to approve. The latter proce-
dure has been a recent innovation and does not 
seem to have a secure legal basis in the treaties 
(Waterfeld 2011).
2. The excessive deficit procedure (EDP). This 
implements the obligations for member states 
1 See: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm. See 
also: EU press release 2011b.
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to keep deficits below 3 percent and govern-
ment debt below or sufficiently declining to-
wards 60 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP). The corrective part of the SGP is strength-
ened by imposing stricter rules and through 
better enforcement. Regarding the stricter rules, 
it will now be possible to open an EDP on the 
basis of the debt criterion: “member states with 
government debt ratios in excess of 60 percent 
of GDP should reduce this ratio in line with a 
numerical benchmark, which implies a decline 
of the amount by which their debt exceeds the 
threshold at a rate in the order of 1/20th per 
year over three years” (EU press release 2011a). 
If they do not, the country can be placed in an 
EDP. Crucially, also in this case the sanction (in 
the form of a non-interest bearing deposit of 0.2 
percent of GDP) can be activated following the 
‘reverse majority’ voting procedure. This deposit 
can then be turned into a fine in case of non-
compliance, and extended – in the case of fur-
ther non-compliance – to up to 0.5 percent of 
GDP.
3. The policing of so-called ‘major macroeco-
nomic imbalances’. The latter are judged accord-
ing to a ‘scoreboard’ of around 10 indicators of 
macroeconomic imbalance, whose content is 
left unclear: “the composition of indicators may 
evolve over time. Thresholds will be identified 
and announced” (EU press release 2011b). If 
there is an imbalance – or if there is risk of the 
emergence of an imbalance  - in a state which 
fails to implement the necessary corrective ac-
tion plan, there is a semi-automatic decision 
making procedure (all the decisions in the pro-
cedure are taken by the ‘reverse majority’ voting 
procedure) which leads to a sanction and the 
potential fine of 0.1 percent of GDP. 
The process is initiated by the adoption on the part of 
the Council of the Commission’s proposal for the An-
nual Growth Survey of the Union, on the basis of which 
the member states draft their SCPs. The latter are then 
assessed by the Commission and approved by the 
Council in July. It is remarked that “draft budgets will 
continue to be sent from governments to national 
parliaments for debate in the second half of the year, 
since they continue to exercise fully their right to de-
cide on the budget” (Ibidem). Throughout the year, the 
economic and fiscal policies of the member states will 
be surveilled on the basis of the recommendations, “in-
cluding consideration of possible further/enforcement 
measures (Excessive Deficit Procedure/Excessive Imbal-
ance Procedure)” (Ibidem). 
The second wider area of intervention, which is strictly 
related to the first and partly uses the same procedures, 
incorporates the Europe2020 strategy and the Euro 
Plus Pact.   The Europe 2020 strategy is the EU’s com-
mon economic agenda. It sets out priorities and targets 
at the EU and national level in order to achieve – in a 
way akin to the failed Lisbon strategy of 2000 – “smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth over the next 10 years” 
(Ibidem). Apart from the targets proposed, which often 
simply re-formulate the Lisbon strategy targets  2, the 
strategy also points to three priorities to guarantee 
macro-economic stability: 1.Putting public finances 
in order; 2. Taking action where there are large cur-
rent account deficits or surpluses and 3. Ensuring the 
stability of the financial sector. Four further priorities 
are highlighted in order to “enhance structural reform: 
1. Helping people get back to work or find new jobs 
by making work more financially attractive; 2.urgently 
reforming pension systems; 3.making sure that unem-
ployment benefits provide an incentive to work and 
4.better balancing flexibility and security in the labour 
market” (Ibidem).  
Moreover, another group of EU member states has 
signed the so-called Euro plus pact. The pact commits 
the signatories to implement reforms in four areas: 
competitiveness, employment, sustainability of public 
finances and reinforcing financial stability. The Pact is 
embedded in the new ‘economic governance’ frame-
work described above, and the commitments are in-
cluded in the so-called National Reform Programmes 
(NRPs) of the member states. The SCPs indicate the 
measures – to be translated into concrete policy ac-
tions – that each state intends to take domestically to 
contribute to what has been decided at the EU level 
(with the annual growth survey). The Euro plus pact 
also strengthens the preventive arm of the SGP, as it 
commits member states to translating EU fiscal rules 
as set out in the SGP into national frameworks through 
a national legal vehicle of their choice. However, “this 
should have a sufficiently binding and durable nature 
2 Seventy-five percent of the population between 20-64 
is estimated  to be employed; three percent of the EU’s GDP to 
be invested in Research and Development; CO2 emissions to be 
reduced by 20 percent; The share of early school leavers to be less 
than 10 percent and at least 40 percent of the younger generation 
should have a degree or diploma; 20 million fewer people at the 
risk of poverty
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(e.g. a constitutional or framework law)” (EU press re-
lease 2001b), with the intention of, in the words of EU 
Commission for Economic and Financial Affairs, to “en-
shrine a balanced budget in the constitution” (EU press 
release 2001c). This latter goal is particularly important 
and has been repeated in, for instance, the recent letter 
that the European Commission has sent to the former 
Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi (La Repubblica 2011a).
Making sense of ‘economic 
governance’
Thus, the innovations are basically three. Let us first an-
alyse the procedure to correct ‘macroeconomic imbal-
ances’. The ambiguity of the ‘scoreboard’ for judging the 
‘macroeconomic imbalances’ allows the Commission to 
touch upon fiscal policy, including taxation and spend-
ing, labour policy, the composition of debt and influ-
ences even domestic decisions such as the allocation 
of resources between sectors, and levels of consump-
tion. Even decisions on wages and budgets can serve 
as benchmarks and be touched upon at EU level (Cor-
porate Europe Observatory 2011: 6; Phillips 2011a).  As 
clearly remarked, recommendations for member states 
can include both revenue and expenditure sides of fis-
cal policy and labour and goods markets. As one com-
mentator put it, “it provides a leeway for demands for 
lower wages and for cuts in welfare” (Corporate Europe 
Observatory 2011: 7). Others have argued that it is prac-
tically an “open door to influencing all areas of national 
economic policy” (Vassalos et al. 2011).
Regarding the Europe 2020 strategy, the reforms are 
arguably more influenced by neoliberal economic 
thinking than even the 2000 Lisbon goals. In fact, the 
emphasis on ‘getting people back to work’ instead of 
creating useful and stable jobs says a lot about the 
extent to which socio-economic policy-making and 
thinking has abandoned the traditional ‘de-commodi-
fying’ goals of European welfare states (Esping-Anders-
en 1990). What is also enhanced – although not new 
(Gray 2004; Bradanini 2009) - is the switch from a ‘right 
to work’ to a ‘duty to work’ discourse and practice, with 
the corresponding framing of the market as the regula-
tor of each individual’s competitive quest, and thus as a 
natural condition, as the ‘realm of freedom’ in human af-
fairs, in contrast to a social-democratic or welfare-state 
conceptualisation of the market as a sphere of conflict, 
which must be regulated (through market-correcting 
measures, and not the current market-enabling social 
policies) (Jessop 2003). The way competitiveness is 
framed within the Europe 2020 strategy is clearly in the 
direction of more flexible labour markets, cutting public 
pensions and liberalising or privatising public services. 
For instance, the fact that competitiveness will be eval-
uated by the national unit labour costs (ULC) implies a 
pro-capital stance. In addition, it has been highlighted 
that labour costs are to be reduced by reforming the 
“degree of centralisation in the bargaining process, the 
indexation mechanism” (Council of the EU conclusions 
2011) and reduce wages in the public sector. Productiv-
ity is to be achieved mostly by “deregulating industry” 
(Council of the EU conclusions 2011). 
Among the policy suggestions, worth mentioning 
is also the classic neoliberal policy advice to increase 
productivity by “further opening of sheltered sectors 
to remove restrictions on professional services, to fos-
ter competition and efficiency, … improve business 
environment, … increasing pension age, limiting early 
retirement schemes” (Council of the EU conclusions 
2011). Although these are not compulsory policies, as 
the commitments involve the goals to be achieved, 
the documents produced stress that these issues men-
tioned above will be given particular attention both in 
the recommendations and in the NRPs and SCPs men-
tioned above (Council of the EU conclusions 2011).
The innovations regarding the SGP have a significant 
influence on national economic policy. We have seen 
that if a country has not committed a budget to the 
scrutiny of the Commission before its parliament has 
seen it or is too slow in reducing debt or deficit, then 
the Commission can demand a financial guarantee it 
won’t give back unless the government changes policy, 
or impose a fine. So, although formally the national par-
liament continues to have the last word on the budget, 
it is easy to see that the new economic governance 
framework strongly constrains the room of manoeuvre 
set to it, lest it face sanctions and fines for years (if it 
wants to adopt different economic and fiscal policies).
One of the main jobs of the government is precisely to 
produce a budget, and the power of the parliament in 
budgetary matters has traditionally been at the root of Eu-
ropean democracy. Now, the democratically elected rep-
resentatives of the people can have a look at the budget 
and vote on it only after the EU institutions have judged 
them (or have imposed a fine). Susan George calls this a 
coup d’état, coupled with the moral dimension that has 
been dominating the debate in public opinion, which is 
centred on the idea that ‘you cannot live beyond your 
means’ (Vassalos et al 2011; George 2011).
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We can thus see that there is an underlying economic 
logic unifying what EU commissioner for Economic 
and Financial Affairs Olli Rehn calls a “quantum leap of 
economic surveillance in Europe” (Phillips 2011a). Wage 
restraint, the reduction of social expenditure, competi-
tiveness and fiscal sustainability are the wider goals to 
be achieved. What can be called a “permanent structur-
al adjustment programme” is being implemented in the 
EU. As can be clearly seen, the issues that are dealt with 
in this new economic governance framework are and 
have been the object of political, social and class strug-
gle for decades. Here they are viewed simply as subjects 
of debates among EU decision-makers, most of whom 
unaccountable to voters. This is highly problematic in 
terms of democratic legitimacy (Schmidt 2010) and is 
bound to generate resentment and disaffection (not 
least for the idea of democracy) among the electorate. 
Whose Europe? Whose Crisis? 
The current economic recession has been interpreted 
as a crisis of capital overaccumulation and profitability 
that has its origins in the 1970s (Callinicos 2010; Foster 
and Magdoff 2009). During the two-three decades be-
fore the financial crash, capitalism has been reproduc-
ing itself accumulating an enormous amount of debt. To 
avoid the collapse of the system, the states have taken 
over that debt, effectively privatizing public spending, 
thus transferring them from the private to the public 
sector. Now, the bill is presented to the majority of the 
citizens, who are forced to accept cuts in salaries, social 
spending and an increasing privatisation and liberalisa-
tion of the economies.
Moving from this abstract level of analysis to the actual 
concrete unfolding of the crisis, one can see that the 
economic crisis has exposed the long-standing prob-
lems of the Eurozone to strain and is now putting at risk 
the very existence of the common currency. While the 
monetary union had achieved the goals of eliminating 
currency fluctuations and interest rate differentials, it 
has done so only by shifting the problem elsewhere, 
namely in the difference in wage-setting mechanisms 
and wage levels. Exchange rates can no longer be used 
to counter economic differences within the Eurozone. 
Hence,
if a deterioration in relative (unit) costs cannot be 
reversed by productivity improvements, unions 
in affected areas will be pressed to accept nomi-
nal wage reductions or low increases as well 
as cuts in nonwage costs, eroding bargained 
statutory social benefits. This may happen even 
without asymmetric shocks, insofar as employ-
ers (and governments) seek price advantages, 
no longer attainable by currency depreciation, 
through wage and benefit cuts instead (Martin 
and Ross 1999: 70)
What this stance implies is that the policy prescriptions 
produced by EU institutions for adaptation tended to 
include supply-side and market-enhancing policies 
such as liberalisation and deregulation. These were and 
are highly politically salient measures. The current re-
forms of economic governance - on which few if any 
national parliaments had a say  (Vassalos et al 2011) – 
make these pressures for reform more stringent, as they 
are now linked with the possibility of sanctions and 
fines. Altvater summarises in this way the constraints 
imposed on member states of the EU:
Within the Eurozone the expense side of gov-
ernment deficits is tightly regulated by the 
Maastricht criteria, even if the budgetary impact 
of the financial crisis has been to disrupt signifi-
cantly the guidelines. The revenue side, on the 
other hand, is subject to regulatory arbitrage in 
favour of investors. Limiting wealth taxes frees 
up money wealth that is in turn used for specu-
lation in financial markets (Altvater 2011).
In short, only wage restraint or government spending 
can vary in order to adjust the ‘real’ economies in the 
single currency area. What this means is a permanent 
pressure on workers and their organisation to adjust to 
the need for competitiveness. However, this effect ma-
terialised in a differentiated way across the Eurozone, 
fuelling the increase of private debt. What happened 
was that the imposition of a one-size-fits-all monetary 
policy in the Eurozone produced asymmetric dynam-
ics in EMU economies. For low-growth countries, the 
ECB rates were too high, and viceversa for high-growth 
economies. In Germany, wage levels were effectively 
curtailed, thus inflation levels were maintained at very 
low levels. This economic slowdown in Germany in turn 
was effectively overcome through supply-side meas-
ures (the Schroeder reforms, for instance) that further 
constrained domestic demand and increased export 
competitiveness. This is another way of saying that Ger-
man capital had found a way to permanently contain 
the wage demands of labour and thus acquire compet-
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itiveness (in Marxian terms, increase relative surplus val-
ue). Here, the real interest rates were much higher than 
in the rest of the Eurozone. In the periphery, and in par-
ticular in the so-called PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece, 
and Spain) economies, high growth fuelled wage lev-
els increases, in turn increasing inflation and thus low-
ering real interest rates. This caused a credit-financed 
economic growth that tended to generate speculative 
bubbles (as in Spain and Ireland). In this way, Germany 
increased exports and reduced imports, and export 
earnings were then profitably invested in peripheral 
economies, not for production but for speculation in 
real estate. The latter economies thus had an availabil-
ity of cheap capital, also attracted by low interest rates. 
In short, the current account surplus of Germany was fi-
nancing the current account deficits and growth of the 
peripheral countries (De Grauwe 2010a). Apart from the 
current account deficits, debts accumulated domesti-
cally in the periphery also as the banks took advantage 
of the homogeneous European money market to ex-
pand their credit operations (Lapavitsas 2011: 289). In 
fact, the public debt/GDP ratio of countries like Spain 
and Ireland was significantly lower than Germany, and 
in the 2000s they even maintained surpluses of the 
budget. 
Relative wages in peripheral countries increased more 
than in Germany and this witnessed the largest slump in 
wages in Europe (Corporate Europe Observatory 2011: 
12) – although there has been a general downward 
pressure on wages. In fact, even the fastest growing 
wages in the Eurozone, the Greek salaries, failed to keep 
pace with productivity growth (Flassback 2011). Hence, 
there is no folly, or greed by ‘irresponsible’ workers here. 
In fact,  “it is not wage increases on the periphery per se 
which cost jobs in Greece and other poorer Eurozone 
countries…but the success of the German bourgeoi-
sie in keeping down wages at home” (McGiffen 2011: 
31; Scharpf 2011: 6-7). For instance, unit labour costs in 
Greece were 130 in 2010 if 2000 is 100, while the corre-
sponding figure for Germany was 105 (Flassback 2011).
According to the economist De Grauwe, the root cause 
of the sovereign debt crisis is precisely the accumula-
tion of debt in the private sectors of the economy (De 
Grauwe 2010a). The public debts reached high levels 
only after the economic crisis (in fact EU government 
debts fell from an average of 72 percent in 1999 to 66 
percent in 2007). 
In fact, De Grauwe explicitly blames the European 
monetary authorities for these imbalances, because 
“bank credit is a more proximate cause of the bubbles 
and booms” and monetary authorities have the power 
to control bank credit by, for instance, setting up dif-
ferentiated deposit requirements and the growth of 
bank credit. (De Grauwe 2010a: 8).  However, in no offi-
cial document there is any acknowledgment of the fact 
that the monetary policy of the ECB played a role in the 
crisis. What is implied is that member states have to deal 
with the imbalances produced by a common monetary 
policy by using their policy instruments, which however 
have been strongly limited by the Commission’s inter-
ventions, for instance with the EDP. This phenomenon 
can be seen as a further instance of the mechanism of 
‘embedded neoliberalism’, with its EU-level disembed-
ding processes that constrain the member states’ abil-
ity to continue providing elements of social protection 
(van Apeldoorn 2002).
The European response to the sovereign debt crisis was 
to approve a series of rescue packages conditional on 
the implementation of austerity measures. However, as 
many point out, such measures may in fact exacerbate 
the vicious circle of low growth – austerity – debt (Vas-
salos et al 2011; Lapavitsas 2011; Callinicos 2011). The 
recessionary impact of the austerity measures imposed 
by the EU makes it unlikely that the public deficits can 
be reduced (Altvater 2011: 273-274). 
On the other hand, what these measures have done 
and are doing is constituting a wide market-enhancing 
‘structural reform’ that is weakening unions, privatising 
and liberalising public services and professions and 
opening up education and health care to private pro-
viders. The structural power of capital is due to increase 
significantly, turning many European political econo-
mies from ‘Social Market Economies’ to ‘Liberal Market 
Economies’ (Scharpf 2009) perhaps confirming that we 
are going through a crisis in neoliberalism, instead of a 
crisis of neoliberalism (Saad-Filho 2010). Whatever the 
ultimate outcome of the Eurozone crisis surplus coun-
tries’ capital is due to benefit from the ability to acquire 
peripheral countries’ productive assets at reduced costs, 
thus enhancing the centralisation of capital (Brancaccio 
and Passarella 2012) and the power of German capital 
(Van der Pijl et al. 2011; Cesaratto 2011).
In addition, another serious problem is the fact that the 
ECB is the only central bank in the world that does not 
lend to governments but to banks. These banks, which 
borrow money from the ECB at low interest rates, then 
buy government debt neatly pocketing the profits. In 
fact, as long as a country is not defaulting the high-risk 
premiums are a formidable source of profits for banks. 
The rescue plans pour credit that is then handed down 
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to the banks. And government austerity plans ensure 
that in the end it is the citizens who transfer an increas-
ing part of their income to private banks. 
Moreover, as Husson notes, since the crisis,
the European governments and the European 
Commission have had one overriding goal: busi-
ness as usual. This goal is however out of reach 
because everything that had helped manage 
the contradictions of the flawed form of Euro-
pean integration such as peripheral Europe’s 
indebtedness and internal Europe’s’ trade imbal-
ances, has been rendered unusable by the crisis 
(Husson 2011: 300).
 The era of cheap credit is over. Peripheral countries will 
not have access to cheap borrowing from abroad to 
ease the pressures of monetary union because of the 
credit crunch. Perhaps we will effectively enter a period 
in which, as Zizek notes, a kind of economic emergency 
is becoming permanent, turning into a constant, a way 
of life (Zizek 2011).
The situation being developed is increasingly one of 
“politics without policies at national level, policies with-
out politics at European level” (Bailey 2008). In turn, this 
creates a situation where economic power is perceived 
to have become political power, generating a condition 
of subalternity of workers and citizens, who are largely 
unable to project onto the political economy interests 
and demands that are incompatible with those of capi-
tal owners, that are increasingly constitutionalised at 
the European level. As Phillips rhetorically asks himself, 
“if a government doesn’t control monetary policy any-
more, and doesn’t control fiscal policy anymore, what’s 
left for a government to do? That’s about all they do, 
other than foreign and judicial policy” (Phillips 2011b). 
Perhaps one should go back to the famous argument 
advanced by philosopher Carl Schmitt: the sovereign is 
he who rules in the state of exception. And ask himself: 
who is it that ‘rules’ at the moment in Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal?  
But what are the historical and social origins of ‘new 
consitutionalist’ neoliberal arrangements?  
Conclusion
This article have proposed a reading of the recent Euro-
pean economic governance reforms by using the con-
cept of ‘new constitutionalism’. After having provided a 
short interpretation of the historical roots of neoliberal-
ism, it has described the reforms and argued that they 
have exacerbated the trend towards the insulation of 
socio-economic policies from popular-democratic con-
trol by opening new doors for technocratic governance 
insulated from electoral accountability. Although these 
arrangements are now firmly in place, the forming of 
technocratic governments insulated from the elector-
ate in some European countries, the increasing aliena-
tion of large sectors of the population from democratic 
politics3  and the rise of radical left-wing or right-wing 
parties across Europe may signal that the consensus 
is eroding and that an ‘organic crisis’ (in its Gramscian 
meaning) is mounting. However, there seems be a lack 
of credible alternatives both at the national and Euro-
pean levels, so that it is difficult to imagine a sequel of 
the European project under new auspices.
We have been witnessing forms of mass protest and 
popular insurrection where people take to the streets 
to protest against austerity measures. In countries such 
as Greece, Portugal and Ireland, having ‘new consti-
tutionalism’ eroded the possibilities of popular influ-
ence on socio-economic governance, is this the only 
form of political agency that people at the lower ends 
of the market hierarchy can have to project their inter-
est in the political economy? And, should we hope, as 
in Streeck’s provocative rhetorical question that “in the 
name of democracy we will soon have the opportunity 
to observe a few more examples?” (Streeck 2011: 28)
3 In Greece and Italy, respectively 20% and 30% of the 
population wants the country to be led by ‘experts’ (La Repubblica 
2011b).
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